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HARD PROPERTIES 
John Martin Fischer 
Parallel to the distinction between hard (temporally non-relational) and soft 
(temporally relational) facts about times is the distinction between hard (tem-
porally non-relational) and soft (temporally relational) properties. David 
Widerker has criticized a suggested account of the distinction between hard 
and soft properties. In this paper the criticism is presented and a refined 
suggestion for an account of the distinction is developed. I claim that this 
proposal avoids the problems adduced by Widerker. 
I 
Incompatibilists argue that a person is never free at a time so to act that some 
"hard fact"-some temporally non-relational, genuine fact-about a prior 
time would not have been a fact. The past is, in this sense, "fixed." Further, 
some incompatibilists about God's foreknowledge and human freedom (in the 
sense of "freedom to do otherwise") claim that God's prior beliefs about 
human actions are hard facts about the times at which they are held; thus, 
they hold that God's prior beliefs are fixed and hence that God's foreknowl-
edge is incompatible with human freedom to do otherwise.! 
One approach to challenging this argument might be called "Ockhamism."2 
The Ockhamist claims that God's beliefs are not hard facts about the times 
at which they are held. Rather, God's beliefs are alleged to be "soft facts"-
temporally relational, non-genuine facts. (Such a fact is not fully accom-
plished and "over-and-done-with" at the time in question; it is not solely 
about the relevant time, but is about other times as well, in some suitable 
sense of "about.") Further, the Ockhamist's claim is that God's beliefs at prior 
times are the sorts of soft facts which need not be fixed at later times. Thus 
the Ockhamist is a compatibilist. 
I have argued, against the Ockhamist, that whereas God's beliefs might be 
soft facts about the times at which they are held, they are nevertheless fixed 
at later times.3 This is because a fact such as that God believes at Tl that 
Mary will go to the baseball game at T3 is similar in certain respects to the 
fact (about Monday) that Jack goes to the store prior to the sun's rising on 
Wednesday. Although they are both soft facts about the times in question, 
they are nevertheless plausibly taken to be fixed at subsequent times in virtue 
of features of their internal structure. 
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One might distinguish two ways of dividing up facts: into "smaller" facts 
and into individuals and properties (and perhaps times). On the first approach, 
the components of a fact are also facts; the conjunction of the components 
comprises the "larger" fact. On the second approach, the components of a 
fact are an individual (or set of individuals) and a property (or set of prop-
erties); the individual's having the property (perhaps at a time) comprises the 
fact. 
Let us say that an agent can at some time T falsify a fact F insofar as he 
can at T so act that F would not have been a fact. And let us say that an agent 
can at some time T affect a property insofar as he can at T so act that some 
individual (who perhaps in fact has the property) would not have (or have 
had) the property. 
With the first method of division, there is the possibility of generating 
"hard-core soft facts." These are soft facts with component facts (of a certain 
sort) which are hard. With the second method of division, we have the pos-
sibility of generating "hard-type soft facts." These are soft facts with com-
ponent properties (of a certain sort) which are hard properties. Parallel to the 
distinction between hard and soft facts is a distinction between hard (tempo-
rally non-relational) and soft (temporally relational) properties. So, whereas 
Judy sits at T1 is a hard fact about Tl, Judy sits at Tl prior to having lunch 
at T2 is a soft fact about Tl. And whereas the property, sitting, is a hard 
property relative to Tl, the property, sitting prior to having lunch at T2, is a 
soft property relative to TI. 
II 
I believe that there are powerful intuitive considerations in favor of taking 
the property, believing that P, to be a hard property relative to the time at 
which the belief is held.4 Further, I have suggested a way of characterizing 
hard properties which has been criticized insightfully in a number of places 
by David Widerker.5 I shall lay out my original suggestion and his criticism: 
then I shall offer a proposal which avoids the difficulties adduced by 
Widerker. This is an important project insofar as one wishes to protect and 
defend the claim that God's belief is a special sort of soft fact, a sort of soft 
fact with a distinctive internal structure. 
My suggestion was essentially this. A soft property, relative to a time T, is 
a property such that if anything were to have that property at T, it would 
necessarily follow that some temporally non-relational (hard) fact obtains 
after T, on any intuitively plausible account of temporally non-relational 
(hard) facts. A hard property relative to T is a property which is not soft 
relative to T. 
To motivate this suggestion, consider the property, reading prior to going 
to the baseball game at T2. Anyone's having this property at Tl entails that 
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she goes to the game at T2; thus, the property in question is deemed a soft 
property relative to Tl. Similar considerations apply to such properties as, 
knowing that the sun will rise at T2, correctly believing that the Giants will 
lose the game at T2, etc. On this approach, a property such as believing that 
Mary will go to the game at T2 is a hard property relative to Tl: it is not the 
case that if anyone were to have this property at Tl, it would necessarily 
follow that some hard fact would obtain at a time after Tl. And this is so, 
even if God believes at Tl that Mary will go to the game at T2 is a soft fact 
about TI. Here, we have combined a hard property with a special sort of 
individual to get a soft fact about TI: this phenomenon constitutes a kind of 
"metaphysical alchemy." 
Consider now Widerker's criticism, which begins with a consideration of 
the fact 
(Yl) The sentence 'Jack will pull the trigger at TIO' is true at TO: 
On Fischer's analysis, (Yl) may be viewed as a fact about TO, whose con-
stitutive elements are: the sentence "Jack will pull the trigger at TlO", the 
property of being true, and the time TO. But now notice that on his account, 
the property of being true is a hard property, relative to TO. Clearly, it is not 
the case that if anything were to have that property at TO, it would necessarily 
follow that some [temporally non-relational] fact obtains after TO. (For ex-
ample, if Jack raises his arm at TO, then 'Jack raises his arm at TO' has the 
property of being true at TO. But this does not entail that some [temporally 
non-relational] fact obtains at some time after TO.) Hence, (YI) would have 
to be treated by Fischer as a hard-type soft fact about TO, which is counter-
intuitive 6 
In "Troubles with Ockhamism," Widerker says: 
.. .let us assume that (14) Smith correctly believes at Tl that it is not the case 
that Jack will sign the contract at T4. Suppose further that Jack has it within 
his power at T2 to sign the contract at T4, but for some reason decides not 
to do so. Intuitively, (14) is a soft fact about the past (relative to T2) of the 
rather soft sort. If Jack had decided to sign the contract at T4, he could have 
brought about the nonobtaining of (14). But now let us examine the consti-
tutive property of (14), the property of correctly believing that it is not the 
case that Jack signs the contract at T4. On Fischer's account, this property 
is a hard property, relative to TI. Clearly, it is not the case that, if anything 
were to have that property at Tl, it would necessarily follow that some 
[temporally non-relational] fact obtains at a time later than TI. For example, 
we can conceive of a possible world in which the said property is exemplified 
by Smith at TI, but in which there are no times later than T I. In such a world, 
(14) would be true, although no [temporally non-relational] state of affairs 
would obtain in it at times later than Tl. Consequently, Fischer would have 
to treat (14) as a hard-type soft fact about Tl, which is counterintuitive.7 
Widerker goes on to say: 
A further problem for Fischer's account is posed by properties, such as ... cor-
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rectly believing that all ravens are white or Jack will sign the contract at T3, 
etc. These properties, too, would have to be treated by Fischer as hard prop-
erties, relative to Tl. But their exemplification by an object at Tl may easily 
yield soft fact of the standard (soft) type, i.e., 
(16) Smith correctly believes at Tl that all ravens are white or Jack will sign 
the contract at T3. 8 
Finally,Widerker says: 
A further indication that Fischer's account of a hard property is incomplete 
is provided by the property 
P4: being immersed in water and being soluble in water. 
This property, which consists of two hard properties-the property of being 
immersed in water, and the dispositional property of being soluble in water-
seems intuitively a hard property, relative to the pertinent time. But on Fis-
cher's account, it would count as a soft property. Keeping in mind that by 
'hard property' Fischer understands a temporally genuine property, and as-
suming that he wants his account of the notion of a temporally genuine 
property to be more than merely a stipulative definition, Fischer owes us an 
explanation of how is it that by combining two temporally genuine properties 
we get a temporally non-genuine property. Note that, being a conjunction of 
two temporally genuine (hard) properties, P4 differs crucially from all of 
Fischer's examples of soft properties, each of which is either a simple soft 
property itself, or contains a soft property as a part. Also, unlike Fischer's 
examples of soft properties, P4, when exemplified by an object at a time T, yields 
a fact about T that can be analyzed as consisting of two hard facts about T.9 
III 
Let me now suggest a more refined account which, I hope, can avoid the 
problems adduced by Widerker. Before the account is presented, I need to 
turn back to the phenomenon of metaphysical alchemy noted above. In some 
cases, one can get a soft fact by combining a hard property with a special 
sort of individual. Above, I claimed that this phenomenon is present in cases 
of God's beliefs: although believing that so-and-so is a hard property, God's 
possessing it is a soft fact (in virtue of God's essential omniscience). In cases 
of metaphysical alchemy of this sort, features of an individual which intui-
tively constitute hard properties do not combine with the pertinent individual 
to form hard facts-yet these features are undeniably relevant to a determi-
nation of the individual's hard properties. This suggests that, in ascertaining 
the hard properties, we need to focus on what is entailed by the hard facts 
about non-essentially omniscient individuals. 
More specifically, let "e" be the complete conjunction of temporally non-
relational, i.e., hard facts about a given time T. I shall say that a property P 
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is a hard property relative to T just in case (i) some individual has Pat T, and 
(ii) for any non-essentially omniscient individual I existing at T, either C 
entails that I has P or C entails that I does not have P.1O 
It is important to see that I am not attempting in this paper to give a fully 
reductive analysis of the notion of a hard property. Rather, I am assuming 
either some adequate account of hard facts or at least clear intuitions about 
clear cases of hard facts. I then construct an account of hard properties which 
makes use of these other notions. Hence, I have a rather circumscribed project 
in this paper. Note also that just as a state of affairs must obtain (or alterna-
tively the proposition in question must be true) for it to be a candidate for 
hard facthood, some individual must have the property at the relevant time 
in order for it to be a candidate for being a hard property relative to that time. 
Now let us apply the new account of hard properties to the examples to 
which Widerker adverts. Remember the fact, 
(Yl) The sentence 'Jack will pull the trigger at TIO' is true at TO. 
Widerker points out that "is true" turns out to be a hard property on my 
original suggestion, and so (Yl) will implausibly be deemed a hard-type soft 
fact about TI0.11 But on the new account, "is true" is not a hard property. 
Consider the sentence, 'Jack will pull the trigger at TlO.' It is not the case 
that the complete conjunction C of hard facts about TO entails that this 
sentence is true. And it is not the case that this conjunction C entails that this 
sentence is false. Remember that the new account of hard properties says that 
P is a hard property relative to T just in case for any non-essentially omnis-
cient individual I either the complete conjunction C of hard facts about T 
entails that I has P or it entails that I does not have P. Thus, on the new 
account, "is true" need not be deemed a hard property relative to TO. 
Also, consider the fact that Smith correctly believes at Tl that it is not the 
case that Jack will sign the contract at T4. Widerker notes that on my original 
account, the property, correctly believing that it is not the case that Jack will 
sign the contract at T4, must be considered a hard property relative to Tl. 
This is because the fact about Smith's belief is (according to Widerker) 
compatible with time's stopping right after Tl; if this is correct, then it is not 
the case that if anything were to have the property in question at Tl, it would 
necessarily follow that some temporally non-relational state of affairs would 
obtain after Tl. But note that the new account of hard properties implies the 
correct result, i.e., that the property, correctly believing that it is not the case 
that Jack will sign the contract at T4, is a soft property relative to Tl. This 
is because the complete conjunction C of hard facts about the world at Tl 
neither entails that Smith has this property at Tl nor that Smith does not have 
this property at T 1. 
Widerker's next criticism consists in pointing out that on my original sug-
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gestion certain disjunctive belief properties which are intuitively soft prop-
erties must be considered hard. 12 Widerker's example is that of correctly 
believing at Tl that all ravens are white or Jack will sign the contract at T3. 
On my original account, this property would be a soft property if any indi-
vidual's possessing it at Tl would entail that some hard fact obtains after Tl. 
But presumably there can be worlds in which all ravens are white and in 
which time ends right after Tl. Thus, on my account, the property in question 
would have to be considered a hard fact. 
Widerker's example here involves a belief whose first conjunct is false. In 
"Two Forms of Fatalism" he gives a similar example, saying: 
A further problem for Fischer's account is posed by properties such as: 
... correctly believing that either Smith weighs 50 kg on January I, or Jack 
will sign the contract on January 3 (where the first disjunct is false). These 
properties turn out, on his definition, to be hard properties relative to, say, 
January 1. But their exemplification by some individual on January 1 may 
easily yield soft facts of the standard type. 13 
But it seems to me that the problem also emerges if the first disjunct is 
true. Consider the property, correctly believing at Tl that either all ravens 
are black or Jack will sign the contract at T3. On my original account this 
property must be considered a hard property relative to Tl, because an indi-
vidual (who believes that all ravens are black) can have this property com-
patibly with the world's ending right after Tl. Fortunately, on the new 
account, both sorts of disjunctive belief properties-the one with a false first 
disjunct and the one with a true first disjunct-are considered soft properties 
relative to Tl. 
Widerker's final criticism consists in pointing out that certain conjunctive 
properties which are intuitively hard must be considered soft on my original 
account. Indeed, these examples involve another form of alchemy, because 
when one combines two elements each of which is a hard property, one gets 
a soft property. Widerker's example is a property such as, being immersed in 
water at Tl and being soluble at Tl. Widerker claims, "Fischer owes us an 
explanation of how is it that by combining two temporally genuine properties 
we get a temporally non genuine property."14 Whence the metaphysical al-
chemy? How do we get softness by combining hard conjuncts? 
Presumably, Widerker assumes that being soluble in water entails that if 
the object is placed in water at Tl, it will dissolve at some later time. Thus, 
anything's having the conjunctive property at Tl will entail that an object 
dissolves in water at some later time. If Widerker's assumption were true, 
then this would constitute a counterexample to my original suggestion. But 
I do not think the putative entailment in the assumption really obtains. For 
example, it is possible (in some broad sense) that a magician place a hard 
shell around the object immediately after it is placed in water; thus, although 
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it is soluble (in virtue of its intrinsic composition), it is not the case that it 
would dissolve at some later time, if it were placed in water at T1Y (Also, 
it is possible in some broad sense that the water freeze immediately after the 
object is placed in water; again, if this were to happen, it would not be the 
case that if the object were placed in water at Tl, it would dissolve at some 
later time.) Thus, it is not the case that anything's having the relevant con-
junctive property at Tl would entail that an object dissolves in water at some 
later time. Hence, the example is not a counterexample to my original sug-
gestion. 
In any case, the new account of hard properties does not generate alchemy 
of the sort described by Widerker. Consider the example of the property of 
being immersed in water at Tl and being soluble in water. The new account 
of hard properties implies that the conjunctive property is hard: the complete 
conjunction C of hard facts about T will either entail that I has this property 
or it will entail that I does not have this property, for any suitable I. (I assume 
here that facts about an object's intrinsic structure-perhaps together with 
the laws of nature-entail whether or not it is soluble in water.) 
IV 
In this paper I have sharpened the account of hard properties. I have thus 
attempted further to support the claim that God's beliefs are hard-type soft 
facts. The underlying rationale of the project is to bring out more crisply the 
gut-level inchoate feeling that there is an important difference between stand-
ard sorts of soft facts and God's beliefs. God's beliefs are distinctive; whereas 
standard soft facts are soft-type soft facts, God's beliefs are, if soft at all, 
hard-type soft facts. And this distinctive internal structure may be pertinent 
to the fixity characteristics of facts about God's beliefs. 
It is very important to recognize that not all soft facts are relevantly similar. 
Consider, for example, two arguments of Alvin Plantinga. 16 First, Plantinga 
argues that facts about God's beliefs are similar to standard soft facts insofar 
as they entail intuitively hard facts about subsequent times. Thus, for exam-
ple, both It is true at Tl that Mary will go to the game at T2 and God believes 
at Tl that Mary will go the game at T2 entail that Mary goes to the game at 
T2; the facts are in this respect similar. But pointing to this similarity is not 
sufficient to vindicate the claim that the two facts are relevantly similar, i.e., 
similar with regard to all their fixity characteristics. Such characteristics may 
in part be a function of a fact's internal structure, and the fact about God's 
belief may have a crucial component which is hard. 
Second, consider Plantinga's "equivalence argument." Plantinga points out 
that, on the assumption that God exists necessarily, the facts, God believes 
at TI that Mary goes to the game at T2 and Mary goes to the game at T2 are 
necessarily equivalent. On certain approaches to fact individuation, necessar-
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ily equivalent facts would be identical. But in any case, since Mary goes to 
the game at 1'2 is clearly not a hard fact about Tl, and Mary goes to the game 
at 1'2 is necessarily equivalent to God believes at Tl that Mary goes to the 
game at T2, it is plausible to conclude that God believes at Tl that Mary goes 
to the game at T2 is not a hard fact about T1. 
We can grant the conclusion of Planting a's equivalence argument. But again 
we must point out that it does not entail that the two facts are relevantly 
similar. Any fact necessarily equivalent to a soft fact may be a soft fact-but 
it remains open that it be a hard-type soft fact. Thus, again, Plantinga's 
argument is not sufficient to vindicate Ockhamism. 
There are indeed troubles with Ockhamism-the cushy, comfortable ana-
logue of soft determinism. It does not suffice to vindicate Ockhamism that 
God's beliefs are soft facts about the times at which they are held; there is a 
structure and articulation to these facts which cannot be ignored. The intrac-
table hard elements of God's beliefs just won't go away. These irrefragable 
residual elements are analogues in a broad sense of Austin's frog staring up 
from the bottom of the mug. There are troubles in paradise. 
Once upon a time-many years ago-philosophers believed in hard facts 
and soft facts. And this was a good distinction, one which revealed something. 
But whereas it revealed something, it also concealed something. More pre-
cisely, an excessive preoccupation with the distinction and with classifying 
facts as hard or soft concealed the reticulate inner complexity of soft facts. 
University of California, Riverside 
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